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We study the secrecy properties of Gaussian states under Gaussian operations. Although such op-
erations are useless for quantum distillation, we prove that it is possible to distill a secret key secure
against any attack from sufficiently entangled Gaussian states with non-positive partial transposi-
tion. Moreover, all such states allow for key distillation, when Eve is assumed to perform finite-size
coherent attacks before the reconciliation process.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.-a
Quantum Information Theory (QIT) analyzes the pos-
sibilities offered by quantum states for information en-
coding and transmission. New processes such as tele-
portation [1], more powerful algorithms [2] or completely
secure data transmission [3] become possible by exploit-
ing quantum effects. Most of the QIT applications use
entanglement as resource. It is therefore one of the most
important tasks of QIT to determine if a given state is
entangled, and if yes, whether its entanglement is “use-
ful” for information processing. Distillable states [4, 5]
posses such useful entaglement: using several copies of
them and local operations and classical communication
(LOCC), one can create a smaller number of maximally
entangled states, which can be used for variety of quan-
tum information tasks. Given a state, its distillable en-
tanglement, ED, measures the amount of pure-state en-
tanglement that can be extracted from it. Particularly
important for cryptography is another measure of entan-
glement KD: it specifies the number of secret bits that
can be extracted from a quantum state using LOCC. Ob-
viously, KD ≥ ED, since a secret key can always be ex-
tracted from distilled maximally entangled states, using,
for instance, the Ekert protocol [6]. Entangled states
which cannot be distilled, i.e. for which ED = 0, ex-
ist and are termed “bound entangled” [8]. Although it
was unclear whether these states could contain useful en-
tanglement, it has been recently shown that there exist
bound entangled states for which KD > ED = 0 [7].
All of the above results were originally considered for
finite dimensional systems. More recently, many of these
concepts have been translated to the infinite dimensional
case [9]. In these systems, a key role is played by the
set of Gaussian states and Gaussian operations. First
of all, it naturally appears in experiments. In fact, non-
Gaussian operations turn out to be very challenging from
an experimental point of view. Moreover, the theoretical
analysis of Gaussian states and operations is also simpli-
fied since all their properties can be expressed in terms
of finite-dimensional matrices.
To analyze the limitations and possibilities offered by
the Gaussian scenario is a relevant issue. The teleporta-
tion of coherent states of light have been experimentally
demonstrated [10]. Quantum cryptography has also been
successfully translated into the Gaussian regime. Gottes-
man and Preskill proposed to use squeezed states and ho-
modyne measurements in a “prepare & measure” scheme
[11]. Actually, no squeezing is required, since coherent
states are already sufficient for a secure key distribution
with Gaussian operations [12, 13]. The experimental im-
plementation of a coherent-state protocol has been re-
cently realized in [14]. From a more fundamental point
of view, it is interesting to know which information tasks
can be achieved in the Gaussian regime. It is known that
all Gaussian states have positive Wigner function, i.e.
there is a local variable model reproducing all the (sym-
metrically ordered) correlations for Gaussian states. De-
spite the existence of this local description, these states
and operations are useful for teleporting quantum states,
or for secure information transmission, applications that
are impossible in a classical scenario.
An important negative result in this context was ob-
tained in Refs. [15, 16]: quantum distillation by Gaussian
operations is impossible. That is, although it is known
that all Gaussian states with non-positive partial trans-
position (NPPT) are distillable [17], any distillation pro-
tocol must include a non-Gaussian operation. This can
be rephrased saying that all entangled mixed states are
bound entangled in the Gaussian scenario. In this sce-
nario, it is natural to define the corresponding Gaussian
versions of entanglement measures, that specify the en-
tanglement properties of these states under Gaussian Lo-
cal Operations and Classical Communication (GLOCC).
For example, GED defines the Gaussian Distillable En-
tanglement. The results of [15, 16] imply that GED = 0.
However, these states may still be useful, since perhaps
secret bits can be extracted from them using GLOCC.
In a similar way as for distillable entanglement, for any
entangled state one can denote by GKD the amount of
secret bits that can extracted by GLOCC. This quantity
refers to the distribution of a secret key, and in princi-
ple is independent of entanglement distillability. Thus,
secret bits (GKD) appear as a resource (measure) es-
2pecially suitable for the analysis of entangled Gaussian
states under Gaussian operations: while GED = 0 for all
states, there are states with positive GKD [11, 13].
In this work we analyze the secrecy properties of Gaus-
sian states under Gaussian operations [18]. We consider
a protocol where Alice and Bob measure their shared
entangled state at the single-copy level and process the
obtained classical results [19]. This type of protocols can
easily be translated to prepare & measure schemes. First,
we study the security of our protocol when Eve applies an
incoherent attack, that is she individually measures her
state before any key extraction process is started. Under
these conditions, all NPPT states turn out to be secure.
The same conclusion holds when Eve applies a coherent
attack on a finite number of symbols. All these cases
would correspond to a situation where Eve’s quantum
memory has a finite coherence time. Then, we consider
more powerful attacks and show that our security proof
ceases to work for some NPPT states. Finally, using the
recent results of Ref. [20], we demonstrate the security of
sufficiently entangled Gaussian states against any attack.
We consider quantum systems of n canonical degrees
of freedom, often called modes, H =  L2(ℜn). The com-
mutation relations for the canonical coordinates R =
(X1, P1, . . . , Xn, Pn) = (R1 . . . , R2n) read [Ra, Rb] =
i(Jn)ab, where a, b = 1, . . . , 2n and
Jn = ⊕
n
i=1J J ≡
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (1)
The characteristic function, χρ(x), of a state ρ is defined
as χρ(x) ≡ tr(ρW (x)), where W (x) = exp(−ix
TR) are
the so-called Weyl operators. Gaussian states are those
states such that χρ is a Gaussian function,
χρ(x) = exp(ix
Td−
1
4
xTγx). (2)
where d is a 2n real vector, called displacement vector
(DV), and γ is a 2n× 2n symmetric real matrix, known
as covariance matrix (CM). The positivity condition of ρ
implies that γ−iJn ≥ 0. All the information about d and
γ is contained in the first and second moments tr(ρRi)
and tr(ρRiRj).
In what follows we consider two parties, Alice and Bob,
that share a state ρ in a composite systems of n + m
modes. The global CM is
γAB =
(
γA C
CT γB
)
≥ iJn+m, (3)
where γA (γB) is the CM for the n-mode (m-mode) Gaus-
sian state of system A (B). The entanglement properties
of ρ are completely specified by its CM.
The effect of partial transposition at the level of CMs
can be understood from the fact that this map is equiva-
lent to time-reversal. After partial transposition on, say,
A, the sign of Alice’s momenta is changed while the rest
of canonical coordinates is kept unchanged. Denote by
θ the matrix equal to the identity for the position coor-
dinates and minus the identity for the momenta. Par-
tial transposition means that γAB → γ
′
AB = θAγABθA.
Therefore, the state ρ has positive partial transposition
(PPT) when γ′AB defines a positive operator, that is
γ′AB ≥ iJn+m. The PPT criterion provides a necessary
and sufficient condition for separability for 1× 1 [21] and
1 × N Gaussian states [22], while it is only a necessary
condition for the rest of systems [22]. As said above, the
non-positivity of the partial transposition is a necessary
and sufficient condition for distillability [17].
Two known results will play an important role in what
follows. First, any NPPT Gaussian state of n+m modes
can be mapped by GLOCC into an NPPT 1×1 Gaussian
and symmetric state [17], whose CM, see Eq. (3), is
γA = γB =
(
λ 0
0 λ
)
C =
(
cx 0
0 −cp
)
(4)
where λ ≥ 0 and cx ≥ cp ≥ 0. The positivity condition
reads λ2 − cxcp − 1 ≥ λ(cx − cp) while the entanglement
(NPPT) condition gives
λ2 + cxcp − 1 < λ(cx + cp). (5)
And second, given an n-mode Gaussian state ρ1 with
CM γ1, it is always possible to construct a 2n mode pure
Gaussian state |Ψ12〉 such that tr2(|Ψ12〉〈Ψ12|) = ρ1 [23].
The global CM γ12, see Eq. (3), has γA = γ1 and
γB = θγ1θ
C = JnS
(
⊕ni=1
√
λ2k − 11 2
)
S−1θ, (6)
where {λk} defines the symplectic spectrum of γ1 and S
is the symplectic matrix such that STγ1S is diagonal.
Having collected all these facts, let us describe how
Alice and Bob can distill a key from a distillable n ×m
Gaussian state using only Gaussian operations. Since all
the NPPT Gaussian states can be mapped into symmet-
ric and entangled states of two modes by GLOCC, we
restrict our analysis to this type of states. In equivalent
terms, one can think that the first step in the key dis-
tillation protocol is the GLOCC transformation of [17]
that transforms any NPPT state into an entangled state
of this family. Then, both parties measure the X quadra-
ture, where XA and XB denote the measured operator
and xA and xB the obtained outcome. After communica-
tion, they only accept those cases where |xA| = |xB | = x0
[24]. Each party associates the logical bit 0 (1) to a pos-
itive (negative) result with the probability p (i, j), with
i, j = 0, 1. This process transforms the quantum state
into a list of correlated classical bits between Alice and
Bob. Their error probability, that is the probability that
their symbols do not coincide, is given by
ǫAB =
∑
i6=j p (i, j)∑
i,j p (i, j)
=
1
1 + exp
(
4cxx
2
0
λ2−c2
x
) . (7)
3In order to establish a key, Alice and Bob will now
apply the advantage distillation protocol introduced by
Maurer [25]. Alice generates the random bit b. Then,
she chooses N items from her list of symbols, ~bA =
(bA1, bA2, . . . , bAN ), and sends to Bob the vector ~b such
that bAi + bi = b mod 2, ∀ i = 1, . . . , N , together with
the list of chosen symbols. Bob computes bBi+ bi for his
corresponding symbols, and if all the results are equal,
bBi + bi = b
′, ∀ i, the bit is accepted. If not, the sym-
bols are discarded and the process is repeated for another
vector. The new error probability is (see also [26, 27])
ǫAB,N =
(ǫAB)
N
(1 − ǫAB)N + (ǫAB)N
≤
(
ǫAB
1− ǫAB
)N
, (8)
that tends to an equality for N →∞.
What is the information that Eve can obtain? As
usual, all the environment, all the degrees of freedom
outside Alice and Bob’s systems should be accessible to
her. This means that the global state including Eve is
pure, |ΨABE〉, and such that trE(|ΨABE〉〈ΨABE |) = ρAB
[28]. Denote by |e±±〉 Eve’s states when Alice and Bob
have projected onto | ± x0〉. For the case of individual
attacks, it was shown in [26] that Eve’s error in the esti-
mation of the final bit b is bounded from below by a term
proportional to |〈e++|e−−〉|
N . Therefore, Alice and Bob
can establish a key if (see [26] for more details)
ǫAB
1− ǫAB
< |〈e++|e−−〉|. (9)
More precisely, if this condition is fulfilled, there is al-
ways a finite N such that the new list of symbols can be
distilled into a secret key using one-way protocols [29].
From Eq. (6), one can compute the global pure state
including Eve. Note that taking the Gaussian purifica-
tion does not imply any loss of generality on Eve’s indi-
vidual attack [28]. After projecting on | ± x0〉, Eve has
a Gaussian state of two modes, with the CM and DV for
the states |e±±〉 given by
d++ = −
√
λ2 + λ(cx − cp)− cxcp − 1
λ+ cx
(0, 0, x0, x0)
γ++ =
(
γx 0
0 γ−1x
)
γx =
(
λ cx
cx λ
)
, (10)
while γ−− = γ++ and d−− = −d++. Now, the overlap
between these two states is given by
|〈e++|e−−〉|
2 = exp
(
−
4(λ2 + λ(cx − cp)− cxcp − 1)x
2
0
λ+ cx
)
.
(11)
Substituting Eqs. (8) and (11) in (9) one can check, af-
ter some algebra, that this condition is equivalent to the
entanglement condition of (5). That is, all the distill-
able (NPPT) Gaussian states allow a secure key distribu-
tion under individual attacks using Gaussian operations.
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FIG. 1: Security analysis of symmetric 1× 1 Gaussian states
when cx = cp = c. All physical states are above the solid
line. The dashed line defines the entanglement limit, that
coincides with the security bound against incoherent attacks.
States below the dotted line are secure against any attack.
Moreover, the limits for NPPT entanglement and key dis-
tillation also coincide if Eve measures in a coherent way a
finite number NE ≪ N of states before the reconciliation
process [30]. Interestingly, these limits hold for any x0,
and measurements of arbitrary resolution [24].
One may wonder what happens when Eve is no longer
restricted to individual attacks. Indeed, a more powerful
Eve could wait until the end of the advantage distillation
protocol and measure in a coherent way all her N sym-
bols [31]. One can see that the corresponding security
condition is similar to Eq. (9), but replacing Eve’s states
overlap by its square. This new inequality is violated by
some NPPT states (see figure 1). Note that this only
implies that the analyzed protocol is not good for these
states in this more general scenario.
Nevertheless, using the recent techniques of Ref. [20],
we can find states for which the presented protocol allows
to extract common bits secure against any attack. After
a successful X measurement on the state (4), Alice, Bob
and Eve share an effective state
|Ψ2×2ABE〉 =
√
1− ǫAB
2
(|++〉|e++〉+ | − −〉|e−−〉)
+
√
ǫAB
2
(|+−〉|e+−〉+ | −+〉|e−+〉). (12)
Then, it has been shown in Ref. [20] that the amount of
secret bits, R, that Alice and Bob can extract from their
known quantum state [19] by means of protocols using
one-way communication is
R ≥ I(xA : xB)− S(ρ
2×2
AB ), (13)
where I is the mutual information between their measure-
ment outputs and S(ρ2×2AB ) the von Neumann entropy of
their reduced state. In this case, this condition turns out
to be dependent on x0. Thus, for any state, one has to
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FIG. 2: Schematic representation of quantum and classical
key distillation techniques from quantum states. In this work,
Alice and Bob only perform Gaussian operations.
look for a value of x0 such that R > 0. Although we
were not able to solve this problem analytically, it can
be attacked using numerical methods. For example, the
security curve for those states such that cx = cp (see Eq.
(3)) is shown in figure 1.
One can envisage different ways of improving the pre-
vious security analysis, e.g. finding better measurements
for Alice and Bob or new ways of processing their mea-
surement outcomes. A more interesting possibility con-
sists of allowing the honest parties to manipulate in a
coherent way several copies of their local states. Actu-
ally, in the study of GKD with full generality, one should
deal with joint (although local and Gaussian) operations
by Alice and Bob. This defines a new type of Gaus-
sian quantum privacy amplification protocols [5] different
from entanglement distillability where Alice and Bob’s
goal is simply to factor Eve out [15, 18].
A related open question that deserves further investi-
gation is whether secret bits can be extracted from PPT
Gaussian states, i.e. strict bound entangled states (cf.
[7]). At present, we know that our scheme does not work
for any PPT state. The details of the proof are quite
involved and will be given elsewhere.
Quantum and classical distillation (QD and CD) pro-
tocols are two techniques that allow to extract secret bits
from entangled states. A schematic comparison between
them is shown in figure 2. In finite systems, there are
examples of non-distillable quantum states for which the
CD branch is possible [7]. Moving to continuous variables
systems and the Gaussian scenario, QD techniques are
useless for key-agreement [15, 16]. Our analysis proves
that CD is still useful for (i) all NPPT states under finite
coherent attacks and (ii) sufficiently entangled NPPT
states under general attacks. Thus, our results close the
gap between NPPT entanglement and security for the
case of finite-size coherent attacks.
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